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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,
Case No. 20050257-SC

vs.
JAMES L. ROBISON,
Defendant/Respondent.

BRIEF OF PETITIONER
* * *

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of
Appeals. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) (West
2004).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Should the court of appeals have reversed a felony conviction on a novel
question of law that was neither raised nor briefed by either party?
Standard of Review. Courts have discretion to decide any issue "necessary to a
proper decision." Kaiserman Assoc, Inc. v. Francis Town, 977 P.2d 462, 464 (Utah
1998). This court therefore reviews the court of appeals actions for abuse of
discretion.

2. Does Utah's bad check statute, which prohibits issuing a bad check "for
the purpose of obtaining... any money, property, or other thing of value/' require a
"substantially contemporaneous exchange"?
Standard of Review. This issue concerns a question of statutory interpretation
that this Court reviews for correctness. See State v. husk, 2001 UT 102, \ 11,37 P.3d
1103.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
This appeal requires interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (West 2004),
attached as Addendum B.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1
In the fall of 2001, defendant, a licensed car dealer, had a customer who
wanted a GMC three-quarter ton pickup truck (R. 396:8). He contacted Randy
Painter, another car dealer, to help him find the specific truck his customer wanted
(R. 396:5-6). Painter agreed and within a month had found and purchased a truck
for defendant (R. 145,150; 396:4-5). Defendant picked the truck up from the Painter
on September 1, 2001, and took it to show to his customer (R. 396:8). As was
customary among dealers, defendant did not pay for the truck or sign a purchase
contract at that time (R. 396:13). Instead, he took the truck with the understanding

1

The facts of the crime are taken from the victim's testimony at a hearing on a
motion to quash a search warrant, at which defendant was present (R. 396).
2

that if his customer wanted it, Painter would sell it to defendant for $40,812 (R.
396:9).
Defendant contacted Painter that same day and told him that his customer
wanted the truck (R. 396:10). He said that he would get a check in the mail to
Painter, and Painter expected, as was customary with a dealer to dealer transaction,
that defendant would pay him within a couple of days (R. 396:11). Sometime
between September 12th and September 15th, Painter received a check from
defendant for $40,812 (R. 396:11). The check bounced (R. 128; 396:12).
Painter left several messages on defendant's answering machine about the
bounced check (R. 396:15). He also went looking for defendant, but could not find
him (396:15). On September 25, 2001, defendant faxed Painter a copy of a receipt
showing that he had deposited a second check for $40,812 into Painter's bank
account (R. 121; 396:12). Painter assumed that defendant would not write two bad
checks, so he mailed defendant the title (R. 396:18-19). A few days later, Painter
received notice that the second check had also bounced (R. 122; 396:19). Defendant
never made good on the dishonored checks and did not return the truck to Painter
Motors, but rather, sold it to his customer (R. 6, 398:21).
The State charged defendant with two counts of issuing a bad check and one
count of theft by deception (R. 109-10). Defendant asserted that he did not use the
check to induce Painter Motor to give him the truck, but rather, claimed the check
3

was for payment on an existing debt from an oral agreement to buy the truck (R.
398:6-7). Defendant and the State negotiated a plea agreement to one count of
issuing a bad check (R. 242-247,398).
At the plea hearing, the parties disagreed as to whether defendant would
plead guilty or no contest (R. 398:3-4). After some negotiation and explanation of
the difference between a guilty plea and a no contest plea, defendant decided to
plead guilty (R. 398:8). The court asked defendant whether he had reviewed the
written statement in advance of plea with his attorney (R. 398:8-9). Defendant
replied that he had (R. 398:9). The court asked defendant if he had any questions
about the statement (R. 398:9). Defendant asked a question about restitution, which
the court, defense counsel, and the prosecutor all carefully answered (R. 398:9-12).
The court then reviewed with defendant the constitutional rights he would waive by
pleading guilty including: the right to a speedy trial by an impartial jury, the right to
require the State to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the right to confront and
cross-examine witness, the right to subpoena witnesses, the privilege against selfincrimination, and the right to appeal his conviction (R. 398:13-14). The court then
explained the minimum and maximum sentence of one to fifteen years in prison and
a $10,000 fine (R. 398:14). Defendant asked a question about the minimum sentence
(R. 398-14-16). The court carefully explained to defendant how sentencing worked
and the roles of the Board of Pardons and Parole and Adult Probation and Parole (R.
4

398:14-16). Defendant conferred with his attorney off the record and then told the
court that he understood the maximum penalty (R. 398:16-17).
The court asked defendant whether the plea was his "free voluntary act/ 7 to
which defendant responded that it was (R. 398:19). The court then asked defendant
to sign the statement in advance of plea (R. 398:20). Defendant again affirmed that
he was pleading guilty to one count of issuing a bad check (R. 398:20). The
prosecutor provided a factual basis for the plea, stating that defendant had issued a
check in exchange for something of value on an account that was closed (R. 398:20).
Defendant objected and stated that the account was not closed (R. 398:20). The court
and defendant then held the following exchange:
DEF:

— payment was not, was not honored by the bank but the
account was not closed. I have a letter in my file from the
institution stating that it was open.

JUDGE: Okay. You, you did issue a check which was not honored by
your bank. Is that correct?
DEF:

That's correct.

JUDGE: And a, upon notice of it not being honored did you, did you
at any time make that check good?
DEF:

I attempted to, Your Honor, and my bonding company also
attempted to, but we were not able to completely do it.

JUDGE: Okay. And a, in exchange for that a car was delivered. Is
that correct? A vehicle was—
DEF:

No. The car was delivered several weeks prior to that.

JUDGE: Well, I mean—
5

DEF:

There was a vehicle in, a transaction did involve a vehicle.

JUDGE: Yes. Okay. And that vehicle had a value in excess of $5000?
DEF:

It did, Your Honor.

JUDGE: The Court finds there's a factual basis, accepts your guilty
plea, finds it was voluntarily and knowingly given with a full
understanding of your constitutional rights.
(R. 398:20-21).
One month after the plea hearing, on November 15,2002, defendant moved
pro se to withdraw his guilty plea (R. 250-52, attached as Appendix B). He claimed
that the plea he entered at the hearing was "entirely different" from the earlier
agreement he reached with the prosecutor (R. 251). He also claimed to have been
confused, nervous, and unaware of the ramifications of the new arrangement (R.
251).
The court did not immediately rule on defendant's motion. Instead, on
November 26, 2002, it sentenced defendant to a suspended prison term of one-tofifteen years and thirty-six months probation (R. 256-60). It stayed execution of the
sentence, however, to allow defendant time to supplement his motion to withdraw
his guilty plea (R. 256-60).
By February 7,2003, defendant had filed no additional pleadings nor asked
for any additional time on the stay, so the court entered an order denying his
motion to withdraw (R. 283-82). In its written findings, the court found that the

6

plea colloquy strictly complied with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (R.
280, attached as Appendix C). It also found that "[although there was some initial
confusion whether the defendant's plea was going to be a guilty plea or a no contest
plea and the defendant had some questions concerning certain issues,... defendant
entered his plea voluntarily, knowingly and with a full understanding of his
constitutional rights" (R. 280-79). Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal to the
court of appeals (R. 288-84).
In the court of appeals, defendant retained new counsel and reasserted that
the trial court failed to strictly comply with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure. See Br. Aplt. at 6. He claimed that during the plea colloquy there was no
clear statement of the elements of the offense, that he did not admit to the elements
of the offense, and that the written plea agreement was not clear and consistent. Id.
He never specified, however, which element he claimed was not stated during the
plea colloquy, nor did he specify which element of the offense he claimed he did not
admit.
The court of appeals did not set the case for oral argument. Instead, it
reversed the trial court in a memorandum decision from which one judge dissented.

7

See State v. Robison, 2005 UT App 9,3. 2 The majority opinion held that defendant's
plea violated rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, because it lacked an
adequate factual basis. Id. at 2-3. It first acknowledged that defendant "did not
adequately present this issue either to the trial court or to this court/7 Id. at 1. The
opinion concluded, however, that the court could reach the issue sua sponte in order
"to avoid a 'great and manifest injustice/" Id. (quoting State v. Pierce, 655 P.2d 676,
677 (Utah 1982)).
The majority noted that one of the elements of issuing a bad check is that the
defendant issue the check for the purpose of obtaining money, property, or anything
of value. Id. at 2. It then held, without any further analysis and without citation to
any authority, that "this element of section 76-6-505 requires a substantially
contemporaneous exchange."

Id.

The majority then held that defendant's

statement, "'The car was delivered several weeks prior to [issuance of bad check],'"
was "a complete defense to the charge of issuing a bad check." Id. (quoting R.
398:21 (alteration in original)). It further held that "[t]he check was irrelevant to the
transaction involving the sale of the vehicle and simply amounted to payment on an

2

The court's opinion was not published and does not have numbered
paragraphs. The pinpoint cites to the opinion therefore refer to the page number of
the court's slip opinion, attached as Addendum A.
8

open account/7 Id. This Court subsequently granted the State's petition for review
by writ of certiorari.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
The court of appeals abused its discretion when it reversed the trial court on a
novel question of law that it raised sua sponte without briefing from the parties.
"Great and manifest injustice" is not an invitation for an appellate court to fashion a
claim never raised by the parties. Rather, it is merely an exception to the
preservation rule. No Utah court has ever sua sponte raised and argued an issue on
the basis of "great and manifest injustice." To do so places the court in the position
of advocating on behalf of one party to the detriment of the other. This is both
unwise and unnecessary.
Moreover, the court misapplied the manifest injustice standard. A claim is
only manifestly unjust if it is both obvious and harmful.

The "substantially

contemporaneous exchange" rule relied on by the court of appeals presented a
question of first impression in Utah. It was thus not obvious to the trial court. The
claim was also not harmful, because a substantially contemporaneous exchange is
not a dispositive element of Utah's bad check statute.

9

POINT II
The bad check statute's requirement that the check issue for the "purpose of
obtaining" something of value does not require a substantially contemporaneous
exchange. The "purpose of obtaining" element of the statute defines the requisite
mental intent of the offender. While the chronology of the transaction is a factor in
divining the offender's mental state, it is not a dispositive or even a necessary factor.
The statute does not require that the check be exchanged for something of value or
even that something of value be obtained. It only requires that the offender issue
check "for the purpose of obtaining" something of value.
ARGUMENT

I. APPELLATE COURTS SHOULD NOT REVERSE ON NOVEL
QUESTIONS OF LAW THAT ARE NEITHER RAISED NOR
BRIEFED BY THE PARTIES
A longstanding rule of appellate procedure in Utah dictates that claims that
are not briefed "are deemed waived and abandoned." American Towers Owners
Ass'n, Inc. v. CCIMechanical Inc., 930 P.2d 1182,1185 n.5 (Utah 1996); see also Pixton
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. of Bloomington, III., 809 P.2d 746, 751 (Utah 1991)
("Generally, where an appellant fails to brief an issue on appeal, the point is
waived."); Reid v. Anderson, 211 P.2d 206, 208 (Utah 1949) ("Counsel who asserts
error has the burden of showing that error exists. It is not our duty to search the
record in quest for error."); Floor v. Johnson, 199 P.2d 547,551 (Utah 1948) (holding
10
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Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13, f 22, 519 Utah Adv. Rep, 17 (discussing and
rejecting claim under emergency aid doctrine, even though neither party raised or
briefed claim). 3

The Court's opinion states that Brigham City presented a claim under the
emergency aid doctrine. Sh tart, 2005 UT 1 3 , 1 21. A review of the parties' briefs,
however, discloses that no such argument was made to this Court.

At the same time, however, this Court has retained discretion to decide any
issue necessary to a proper decision, regardless of whether the issue was raised and
briefed. See, e.g., Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996,998-99 (Utah 1987) (reversing trial
court for failure to make findings of fact and conclusions of law, even though
neither party addressed absence of findings and conclusions). The court of appeals
exercised that discretion when it held, without briefing from either party, that
Utah's bad check statute requires "a substantially contemporaneous exchange/'
State v. Robison, 2005 UT App 9,2 (unpublished memorandum decision). It did so
on the basis of preventing "great and manifest injustice." Id. at 1-2 (quotations and
citations omitted). The question now before this Court is whether "great and
manifest injustice" is a proper basis for sua sponte raising an unbriefed novel
question of law to reverse a lower court.
This question involves exercise of the court's discretion to reach unbriefed
issues, and the court of appeals actions are therefore reviewed for abuse of
discretion. See Kaiserman Assoc, Inc. v. Francis Town, 977 P.2d 462,464 (Utah 1998).
A.

Neither case law nor sound judicial policy supports a court sua
sponte raising and briefing a novel question of law on the
basis of manifest injustice.

A review of the phrase "great and manifest injustice" in Utah case law
demonstrates that it is not an invitation for an appellate court to fashion a claim
never raised by the parties. Rather, it is merely an exception to the preservation
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Lie Court noted,

"[T]he Rules d > not state that we may review alleged error when no objection at all
is made at the trial level/' Id.

j n quoted Pierce and explained that the claim did

not rise to the level of a "great and manifest injustice." Id. at 81-82. It therefore did
not reach the issue. Id.
In State v. Archambeau, Archambeau appealed his conviction for possession of
a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, claiming that the dangerous weapon
statute infringed on his constitutional right to bear arms. Archambeau, 820 P.2d at
922.

In reviewing Archambeau's claim for plain error and exceptional

circumstances, the court of appeals noted that exceptional circumstances are a
"safety device to make certain that manifest injustice does not result from the failure
to consider an issue on appeal." Id. 923. It then dropped a footnote to a string cite
that included State v. Pierce. Id. at 923 n.5. The court did not reach Archambeau's
constitutional claims. Id. at 922.
In each of these three cases, the phrase "great and manifest injustice" was
mentioned as a basis on which the court might reach an issue that the appellant had
briefed, but had not first raised in the lower court. This Court has held, in fact, that
"in most circumstances, the term 'manifest injustice' is synonymous with the 'plain
error' standard." State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116,121-22 (Utah 1989); see also State v.
Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, 1 23, 94 P.3d 186 (noting that exceptional
circumstances exception is reserved for "the most unusual circumstances where our
failure to consider an issue that was not properly preserved for appeal would have
resulted in manifest injustice"); State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, % 43, 63 P.3d 731
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''An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our
society." Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 1. "A [judge] is bound by his oath not to
be of counsel in any quarrel that shall come before him" Papa v. Kt\, ridden
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-^ Toafv u -: rop>earance of partiality, and at worst render capricious

and arbitrary judgments. See Jetz Services, Inc., v. Chamberlain, 812 S.W.2d 946, 948
' •

.

•

1 5

(Mo. Ct. App. 1991) ("The law is concerned not only with the judge's actual
impartiality but also the public's perception of the judge's impartiality.").
Moreover, there is little reason for reaching an abandoned issue for the sake of
preventing manifest injustice. The failure to address an abandoned claim on appeal
can never really result in "manifest injustice," because there is nothing unjust about
an unfavorable decision for a party that abandoned its winning arguments on
appeal. This is particularly true in the criminal context, where an appellant may
remedy "manifest injustice" by filing a post-conviction petition based on ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel. 4
The State is unaware of any case in which this Court has sua sponte raised an
abandoned issue on the basis of manifest injustice.5 When this Court has reached
issues that parties have not raised, it has done so not to avoid manifest injustice to
one of the parties, but rather, because doing so was "necessary to a proper

4

A civil litigant may remedy manifest injustice by bringing a malpractice
claim against his appellate counsel. However, unlike a post-conviction petition,
such a remedy does not provide the same result that a successful appeal would
have.
5

In death penalty cases, this Court reserves the prerogative "to notice,
consider, and correct manifest and prejudicial error which is not objected to at trial
or assigned on appeal, but is palpably apparent on the face of the record." State v.
Honie, 2002 UT 4, \ 16, 57 P.3d 977 (quotations omitted). The Court reserves this
prerogative "because of the serious and permanent nature of the penalty imposed in
such cases." State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546,552 (Utah 1987). The State is unaware of
any case, however, in which this Court has actually exercised that prerogative.
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attorney for wrongly garnishing a city's bank account were error because
garnishment is not a pleading, motion, or other paper subject to rule 11 sanctions);
see also Hilts ley e. Kyda, , ^ ; ._d , .,-J, .. _
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everting ma. * .;

v/.:.- — !» ^ • *y. <K)S DO • i - t a h ] 937) (vacating 1 ldieudrt

judgment and remanding where court failed to make findings and conclusions in
bench trial, even though neither party raised or briefed issue); Romrell v. Zions First
National Bank, N.A., 611 P.2d 392,395 (Utah 1980) (reversing trial court for failure to
make findings and conclusions where claim was raised roi 1;. w :ime in repl\ PI. ;

granted, even though neither party raised or briefed issue). 6

these cases reprebuu 01 ii) nibidnces m w mui i.hib v. ULU ums reversed <i n ^- ei
irt based on an claim neither party briefed. This Court ha^ always recognize* 1 its
lit to ajfjftrm a lower court on any ground apparent in the record. N < Bniir.i r
. ..ytes, 2002 UT 5 8 , 1 1 3 , 52 P.3d 1158. This is true, "even though such ground or
theory [was] not urged or argued on appeal by appellee/' Limb v. Federated A \dk
Producers Ass'1 1, Inc., 461 P.2d 290,293 n.2 (Utah 1969). This rule does not, however,
"give appellate courts permission to search the record for alternate grounds to
reverse a decision/' Bailey, 2002 UT 5 8 , 1 1 3 n.3.

Although this Court has never specified what types of claims are "necessary
to a proper decision," the above cases suggest that a claim is "necessary to a proper
decision" only if it concerns an obvious, fundamental defect in the litigation that
must be resolved before the appeal can continue. For example, in Acton, the trial
court's failure to make findings and conclusions in a bench trial was "a fundamental
defect that [made] it impossible to review the issues that were briefed without
invading the trial court's fact-finding domain." Acton, 737 P.2d at 99. In Hiltsley, the
Court could not adjudicate the rights of an absent party without that party being
joined to the action. See Hiltsley, 738 P.2d at 1025 (citing Provident Tradesmans Bank &
Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 111 (1968) ("When necessary . . . a court of
appeals should, on its own initiative, take steps to protect the absent party, who of
course had no opportunity to plead and prove his interest below.")). In Estes, the
Court refused to decide the appeal when the litigation was premised on a claim
unrecognized at law because "[i]t simply is not compatible with the rule of law that

This Court has also addressed unbriefed claims where the claims were not
central to the reasons for reversing a lower court. See Stuart, 2005 UT 13, % 22
(reversing for lack of exigent circumstances, but discussing and rejecting claim
under emergency aid doctrine that neither party raised or briefed); State v. Brake,
2005 UT 95, % 12,103 P.3d 699 (discussing proper standard of review for search and
seizure cases where neither party disputed standard of review).
18

: <: lip roreed " J rm \ "
is cognizable at law.

f

i in pd without an allegation of a cause of action that

^ / P.2d at 13lb.

The above cases concern instances in which this Court has reversed the low er
court on a claim neither party raised. Additional guidelines for deciding unbrHK'd
claims may be cuiicU from cases in u rn^ii tin^ ^ ,>i... na^ Ajjirmcu ., .-^w ^ .o.*

t,

,.t(J -j r j i r

r.

riT i. (1 :^i ; . : 1 i c r

i

ivpii c a bi e to reversing a lower court onunbriefed

claims.
It is only appropriate to affirm a lower court on an unbriefed claim where the
claim is "'apparent on the record/" Bailey r P»vle$, 20021 I 58,113, 32 * .'-d : - ^
(quoting Uipoma v. M^r.u,, _.
..p.--

- .•

- ^i

* •• I«^M1 «ht •.!-;.- • -*K

•._/';
.\\ -.

..

.-•

;i

•.. . „

'ienset

. ne jrrin., .-. ...:
• •

* •' *

h *• .itHrm decisions below." Id. a t l 13n.3. hxBauey

this Court held that the alternate ground relied uii by the court of appeals was
apparent in the record because both parties had litigated the alternate ground in the
trial court and the record was "rite u »111 retereru es u > nu ul Lernate ground . 1 d,, at 1

See Bailei fv/Bm dt is, 2001 [ Jl \ pp 3 4 f l 8 1 81 " 3 i l 1 29(E). n • is J

lissenting).

l b be apparent on the record, an alternate ground should also be based on
well-established law. The affirm on any ground rule "does not give appellate courts
]9

license to pull from thin air alternate or novel legal theories/ 7 Bailey, 2002 UT 58, \
13 n.3; see also Alverado v. Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys., 759 P.2d 427,429-30 (Wash.
1988) (en banc) (holding that courts should only reach unbriefed issues when "there
is no dispute about the law").
This Court also stated in Bailey that affirming on an alternate ground might
necessitate supplemental briefing. "[S]ound and prudent appellate practice and
procedure might dictate that the appellate court afford the parties and opportunity
to address and argue an alternate legal theory or ground in supplemental briefs to
the court." Bailey, 2002 "UT 5 8 , 1 1 3 n.3. "Such a practice might act to placate the
parties' legitimate concerns regarding timely and adequate notice and opportunity
to be heard in a meaningful way without necessarily sacrificing the goal of judicial
economy embodied in the 'affirm on any ground r u l e / " Id.
In the instant case, the court of appeals' holding that the bad check statute
requires a substantially contemporaneous exchange was not "necessary to a proper
decision." Unlike the absence of an essential party or inadequate findings and
conclusions, the possible lack of a factual basis in the plea presents no obstacle to the
court rendering a proper decision a decision on the merits. Lack of a factual basis
for a guilty plea, like any other claim, can be waived. See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT
74, 1 11, 10 P.3d 346. Where a defendant claims lack of a factual basis, but
inadequately briefs the claim on appeal, the court should simply hold that the
20

defendant's claims are inadequately briefed, or resolve them on the merits to the
extent that he has briefed them, and then affirm his conviction. See State v. Gamblin,
2000 UT 44, ff 7-8,1 P.3d 1108 (holding that court need not consider defendant's
claim of an involuntary guilty plea where defendant inadequately briefed . \.
court does not need to reach out, ab tri, . . M . - . J I ^ppca^-.;. ; : . ^

]

^e

.» -. .:

2002 I JT 58 1 II 3 n 5 (noti ng that the affirm on any ground rule ''does not give
appellate courts license to pull from thin air alternate or novel legal theories").
The basis for reversing the trial court was also not apparent in the ivu
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-t +h chronoloev >t the transaction, ihe State had no

notice and no opportunity to respond to the claim that the bad check staiuic
requires a substantially contemporaneous exchange. Moreover, as explained further
in Point I B, the "substantially contemporaneous exchange"' \\n> appjn. u m the
cour t is ai i) thii i,g but \ v ell establisl led ii i U tal t

"iven regarding unbriefed claims.

Rather than declaring defendant's claims

abandoned and affirming the conviction, the court assumed a position of advocacy
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on behalf of defendant and created a new rule of law in order to vindicate him. The
court's action was not justified by resort to the plain error doctrine. Nor was
resolution of the claim was "necessary to a proper decision." The claim was also not
apparent in the record. The court of appeals should have simply held that there was
no error in defendant's guilty plea or that his arguments were inadequately briefed
and affirmed his conviction.

At the very least, it should have requested

supplemental briefing from the parties. See Bailey, 2002 "UT 58, % 13 n.3 (noting that
in reaching unbriefed issues, "sound and prudent appellate practice and procedure
might dictate that the appellate court afford the parties and opportunity to address
and argue an alternate legal theory or ground in supplemental briefs to the court").
The court's failure to dismiss defendant's claim or to request supplemental briefing
constitutes an abuse of distraction, and this Court should therefore reverse.
B.

Even if the court of appeals properly raised a novel question of
law on the basis of "great and manifest injustice," it erred in
applying the manifest injustice standard.

Even if "great and manifest injustice" were a proper standard for deciding an
unbriefed issue, the court of appeals erred in applying that standard. As explained
in Point LA, manifest injustice is essentially plain error. See Verde, 770 P.2d at 12122. Plain error requires both obviousness and harm. See State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, %
15,95P.3d276.
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An error is obvious if "the trial court should have been aware that an error
was being committed at the time." State v, Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 n. 11 (Utah 1 r,c:cM
This requires that "the law governing the error [be] clear at the time t l " n ^ r ^ d
error was made." Dean, _* - _ i • • i IO; sccaho btaic v. tidredge, * * M '.2d, 29, J'I ih
(Ulali IMSM) (i\iftvtJiiit; J i Linn ul plain uuui t"'" IICJC a dispositive appcllah 1 K ase had
i ni ot ; • et beei i decid ed).
In the instant case, the court of appeals' determined that defendant's plea
lacked a factual basis because the facts averred at the plea hearing did tlot
demonstrate a "substantially contemporaneous exchange." Robison, 2005 UT App 9,
^ will be explained more ;iiii* i. , ^ . , h v. tar. -.> u^c* viicck >tatutL does ,o:
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. . . ui^ money propertv, or other thing of value/' Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-502^1;
(West 2004).

Further, no Ut J.
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substantially

contemporaneous exchange is a dispositive element of the crime of issuing a bad
check.

By requiring a substantially contemporaneous exenange, partK ...Mr,.

\ 11 error cannot be obvious if the court must adopt a new rule of law to find the
error.
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The error is also not obvious from the single case, Howells, Inc. v. Nelson, 565
P.2d 1147,1149 (Utah 1977), cited by the court of appeals. See Robison, 2005 UT App
9,2. Howells does not even discuss a substantially contemporaneous exchange rule.
Howells filed a civil action to recover on a worthless check given as payment on a
past due account. See Howells, 565 P.2d at 1149. As part of its action to recover,
Howells alleged fraud. Id. This Court held that no fraud occurred because payment
on a past due account does not induce the payee to give anything of value. Id. In
other words, Howells was not cheated or adversely affected by the worthless check
because the account remained as it was, past due. Id. This holding interpreting
common law fraud does not make it obvious to trial courts that the bad check
statute requires a substantially contemporaneous exchange. This is particularly true
where the bad check statute does not require an intent to defraud.7
Not only was the purported error not obvious, it was not harmful. An error is
harmful if it is '"of such a magnitude that there is a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable outcome for the defendant/"

Dean, 2004 UT 63, \ 22 (quoting State v.

7

Intent to defraud was an element of the crime of passing a bad check before
1973. The legislature removed the intent to defraud element when it reenacted the
Utah Criminal Code in 1973. Compare 1969 Utah Laws ch. 239 § 1 with 1973 Utah
Laws ch. 196 § 76-6-505.
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Evans, 2001 UT 22,116,20 P.3d 888). It must be shown that the error affected the
outcome of the plea process. Id. at % 23.
Defendant was not harmed by the trial court's purported error because the
statutory elements were satisfied here. The statute requires merely that the check
issue "for the purpose of obtaining . . . any money, property, or other thing of
value." Utah Code Ann. §76-6-505(1). As the dissent noted, "the trial court was
well aware of the complete context of [defendant]'s actions from the various pretrial
pleadings and the in-court testimony of the victim at a prior motion hearing."
Robison, 2005 UT App 9, 4. Those pleadings and the prior motion hearing
demonstrated that both the court and defendant were aware of facts proffered by
the State that clearly proved that defendant issued the check "for the purpose of
obtaining" the truck. Id. Those facts include that defendant and the victim had
never transacted business before, that defendant took the truck only to show it to a
potential customer, that the time period between when defendant picked the truck
up and when he mailed the bad check to the victim was only ten days, and that the
victim did not give defendant the title to the truck until he received the bad check.
Id at 5.
Thus, both the court and defendant knew that there were facts alleged to
demonstrate that the check was issued for the purpose of obtaining the truck and
that under those facts defendant did indeed commit a crime. Even if the court had
25

required a more thorough articulation of the facts during the plea hearing,
defendant would not have altered his plea because he already understood the facts
on which the State based the charge.
II.

A SUBSTANTIALLY CONTEMPORANEOUS EXCHANGE IS
NOT A DISPOSITIVE ELEMENT OF THE CRIME OF ISSUING
A BAD CHECK

Before considering the adequacy of the factual basis underlying defendant's
plea, the court of appeals noted that one of the elements of the crime of issuing a
bad check is that the check issue "'for the purpose of obtaining from any person,
firm, partnership, or corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value/"
Robison, 2005 UT App 9 at 2 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505). Then, without
further analysis or citation to authority, the court held, "We conclude that this
element of [the bad check statute] requires a substantially contemporaneous
exchange/7 Id. This was error.
The question of whether the crime of issuing a bad check requires a
substantially contemporaneous exchange is one of statutory interpretation that this
Court reviews for correctness. See State v. husk, 2001 UT 102, \ 11, 37 P.3d 1103
"When interpreting statutes, we determine the statute's meaning by first
looking to the statute's plain language, and give effect to the plain language unless
the language is ambiguous." Blackner v. Dep't ofTransp., 2002 UT 44,f12,48 P.3d
949. The Court's primary goal "is to give effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced
26

by the plain language, in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve/7
State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56,125,4 R3d 795. The Court reads the statutory language
so as "'to render all parts [of the statute] relevant and meaningful/" State v. Maestas,
2002 UT 123, J 52, 63 P.3d 621 (quoting Utah v. Tooele County, 2002 UT 8,110,44
P.3d 680) (emphasis and brackets in Maestas). Accordingly, "'effect must be given, if
possible, to every word, clause, and sentence of a statute

No clause [,] sentence

or word shall be construed as superfluous, void or insignificant if the construction
can be found which will give force to and preserve all the words of the statute/" Id.
at % 53 (quoting Norman J. Singer, 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction §46:06 (4th
ed. 1984)).
Nothing in the plain language of the bad check statute requires the check to
issue contemporaneously with the value received. It requires only that the check
issue "for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or
corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for any services,
wages, salary, labor, or rent." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(1) (West 2004). This
element defines the requisite mental state of the offender. The interval of time
between obtaining the thing of value and issuing the check is but one factor to
consider in determining in determining that mental state—it is not the dispositive
factor. The ultimate question is whether the defendant issued the check for the
purpose of obtaining something of value. This requires the fact-finder to consider
27

all of the evidence that bears on the offender's intent, not just the chronology of the
transaction.
Moreover, requiring a substantially contemporaneous exchange is contrary to
the intent of the statute, because it suggests that the crime of issuing a bad check
requires the defendant to actually obtain something of value. It shifts the focus from
the defendant's intent to whether he succeeded in realizing that intent. Under the
statute, the offender need not actually obtain the thing he seeks, nor must the bad
check be exchanged for the thing he seeks—he need only issue the check "for the
purpose of obtaining" something of value. Utah Code Ann. §76-6-505(1).
The lone case cited by the court of appeals does not support requiring a
substantially contemporaneous exchange in every bad check case. As explained in
Point I.C, Howells, Inc. v. Nelson, does not discuss a substantially contemporaneous
exchange rule. Rather, it considered the question of whether a bad check issued as
payment on a past due account constituted fraud upon the creditor. See Howells,
Inc., 565 P.2d at 1149.
Nor is there any support in other states for the court of appeals' holding.
Only three states have adopted a contemporaneous transaction rule. See Ledford v.
State, 362 S.E.2d 133,134 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987); State v. Rojas-Cardona, 503 N.W.2d 591,
595 (Iowa 1993), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hogrefe, 557 N.W.2d 871, 879
(Iowa 1996); State v. Piatt, 845 P.2d 815, 817 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992). In each of those
28

states, however, the bad check statute requires that the check issue "'in exchange for
a present consideration or w a g e s / " Ledford, 362 P.2d at 556 (quoting Ga. Code Ann.
§ 16-9-20(a)); see also Rojas-Cardon, 503 N.W.2d at 594 ("Theft by check is committed
under Iowa Code section 714.1(6) when a person 'makes, utters, draws, delivers, or
gives any check . . . on any bank . . . and obtains property or service in exchange
therefore

'" (alterations in original)); Piatt, 845 P.2d at 816 ("The Worthless

Checks Act makes it a crime: 'for a person to issue in exchange for anything of
value, with intent to defraud, any check . . . ' " (quoting N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-36-4)).
Thus, the contemporaneous exchange rule in those states arises from an element in
the statute requiring a physical act of exchanging the check for something of value.
It does not follow from those cases that the mental state of acting with the purpose
to obtain something of value must be proven by the physical act of a substantially
contemporaneous exchange.
Because

the bad check statute does not require a "substantially

contemporaneous exchange," the court of appeals erred in reversing defendant's
guilty plea. Defendant admitted that he issued a bad check for the purpose of
obtaining property (R. 246). His pre-plea claims that he was merely paying a debt
on an open account did not obviate his subsequent admission (R. 398:6, 20-21).
Defendant also knew, after sitting through two preliminary hearings and a motion
hearing, that there was evidence that he had issued the check for the purpose of
29

obtaining the truck. Particularly, he issued the check a mere ten days after picking
up the truck and did not receive the title to the truck until he gave Painter the
second bad check (R. 396:11-12,18-19). There was no basis for the court to reverse
his plea, and this Court should therefore reverse the court of appeals.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to reverse
the judgment of the court of appeals.
Respectfully submitted August 23,2005.

MARK L. SHURTLEFF
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL

MATTHEW D. BATES
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Petitioner
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DAVIS, Judge:
James L. Robison appeals the trial court's denial of v his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea to one count of issuing a bad
check. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (2003).x We reverse.
Robison generally argues that the trial court erred by
failing to comply with rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure when it accepted his guilty plea. Specifically,
Robison asserts that his plea does not constitute an admission of
all of the elements of the offense of issuing a bad check. See
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505. We do not necessarily disagree with
the dissent's conclusion that Robison did not adequately present
this issue either to the trial court or to this court. However,
to avoid a "great and manifest injustice," we will reach this
issue sua sponte as an exception to the preservation rule. State
v. Pierce, 655 P.2d 676, 677 (Utah 1982) (per curiam) (stating
that appellate court can reach an issue sua sponte as an
exception to the preservation rule if a "great and manifest
1. Because this statute has not changed since Robison was
charged and convicted, we cite to the most recent version for
convenience.

injustice" would otherwise occur); see also State v. Archambeau,
820 P.2d 920, 923 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (citing Pierce and
noting parenthetically that "court can entertain an exception sua
sponte if facts reveal 'great and manifest injustice' would
otherwise occur" (quoting Pierce, 655 P.2d at 677)) . We agree
with Robison that his conviction is based upon a guilty plea that
does not contain an admission to all the elements of the offense
of issuing a bad check. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505. In good
conscience, we cannot affirm Robison!s conviction of a crime
that, according to the plea colloquy, he did not commit.
Rule 11 provides, in relevant part, that a trial court may
not accept a defendant's guilty plea until the court has found
that the plea is an admission of all the elements of the offense
to which the plea is entered. See Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e),
(e) (4) (A) . One of the required elements of issuing a bad check
under section 76-6-505 is that the defendant must issue a bad
check "for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm,
partnership, or corporation, any money, property, or other thing
of value." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(1), (2). We conclude that
this element of section 76-6-505 requires a substantially
contemporaneous exchange.
During Robison's plea colloquy, Robison admitted that he
issued a bad check. However, when the trial court specifically
asked Robison whether it was correct that the vehicle was
delivered to him "in exchange for" the bad check, Robison
replied, "No. The car was delivered several weeks prior to
[issuance of the bad check] . "2 We conclude that this statement
represents a complete defense to the charge of issuing a bad
check under section 76-6-505, because it establishes that there
was not a substantially contemporaneous exchange--i.e., because
Robison received the vehicle several weeks prior to issuing the
bad check, he did not issue the bad check "for the purpose of
obtaining" the vehicle. Id. The check was irrelevant to the
transaction involving the sale of the vehicle and simply amounted
to payment on an open account. See Howells, Inc. v. Nelson, 565
P.2d 1147, 1149 (Utah 1977) (holding that a bad check issued for
payment on a past due account for goods already received did not
constitute an exchange for property because the payee was "not
induced to give anything of value, nor was it in any way cheated
or adversely affected by the giving of the check").
2. During Robison's plea colloquy, he also characterized his
issuance of the check as payment "on an existing debt."
3. The dissent recognizes this principle from Howells, Inc. v.
Nelson, 565 P.2d 1147, 1149 (Utah 1977), but then proceeds to
(continued...)
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Because Robison's guilty plea was not an admission of all
the elements of the offense of issuing a bad check, see Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-505; we conclude that the trial court erred by
accepting his plea and by denying his subsequent motion to
withdraw his plea. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's
denial of Robison's motion to withdraw his guilty plea and remand
for a trial.

I

CONCUR:

P~&6t m. ^QULL*/)
Judith M. Billings,
Presiding Judge

THORNE, Judge (dissenting):
James Robison pleaded guilty to issuing a bad check and
admitted facts sufficient to establish each element of that
crime. Robison's appellate arguments to the contrary are
inadequately briefed, lack any reasoned analysis or citation to
relevant case law, and shift the burden of research and analysis
to this court. I would reject them on that basis. See Utah R.
3. (...continued)
rely upon cases from other jurisdictions to support the
proposition that a "short delay" between the receipt of goods and
the issuance of a check may still satisfy the exchange
requirement. We are not persuaded by the dissent's reliance upon
these cases that turn on their unique facts.
The dissent also relies upon State v. Bartholomew, 724 P.2d
352 (Utah 1986), in which the Utah Supreme Court affirmed a
defendant's conviction for issuing a bad check when the defendant
issued the check one week after receiving stock shares. See id.
at 352, 355. However, Bartholomew does not specifically address
the issue of a substantially contemporaneous exchange, but
instead focuses upon whether a thing of value was received. See
id. at 354-55. We are equally unpersuaded by the dissent's
reliance upon Bartholomew,
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App. P. 24; State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App 170,^13, 72 P.3d 138.
Further, I see no injustice to Robison in this matter and must
respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
The majority opinion concludes that, as a legal matter,
Robison did not admit to a factual basis for the crime of issuing
a bad check because, at his plea hearing, he admitted only to
writing a check "on an existing debt" and that the truck in
question had been delivered "several weeks prior to" the issuance
of the check. Generally speaking, Utah law provides that the
writing of a check on a past due account for goods already
received does not constitute an exchange "for the purpose of
obtaining . . . any money, property, or other thing of value,"
see Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (2003), because the payee is "not
induced to give anything of value, nor [is he] in any way cheated
or adversely affected by the giving of the check." Howells, Inc.
v. Nelson, 565 P.2d 1147, 1149 (Utah 1977). However, in the
context of Robison's plea hearing, it is clear that Robison's
answers provided the trial court with a factual basis upon which
to accept his guilty plea.
1.

Robison's Factual Admissions at the Plea Hearing

At his plea hearing, Robison never asserted that he had an
open account with his victim, nor did he or his counsel ever
alert the judge to any potential conflict between Robison's
admitted conduct and the statutory language. To the contrary,
Robison admitted in writing at the plea hearing that he was aware
of and understood the "for the purpose of obtaining property"
element of the bad check charge and that there was a factual
basis for that element. Robison waived his right to have the
State prove each element of the offense to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt, both in writing and orally on the record.
Based on these and other admissions and waivers, the trial court
accepted Robison's guilty plea.
The majority opinion relies in part on Robison's assertion
at the plea hearing that his dheck was issued to pay "on an
existing debt." Robison's statement to this effect occurred
outside the formal factual basis colloquy and prior to his
decision to plead guilty to a crime, his decision of what crime
to plead to, and his written admission of factual guilt of the
bad check charge. When Robison made the "existing debt" comment,
he still had the right to present inconsistent theories or
defenses.1 The trial court was under no obligation to consider
1. See State v. Mitcheson, 560 P.2d 1120, 1122 (Utah 1977)
("[The State's burden of proof] gives the defendant the benefit
(continued...)
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such inconsistencies once Robison decided to plead guilty to the
bad check charge and proceeded with the formal plea process,
including submitting his formal factual admissions as required by
Rule 11.
At the plea hearing, prior to the trial court's acceptance
of his plea, Robison signed a statement in support of plea. He
adopted this statement on the record. The typed statement had
handwritten corrections to reflect the last-minute change from a
no contest plea to a guilty plea, although some typed references
to a no contest plea remained. Corrected to reflect Robison 1 s
actual plea of guilty, the statement contained the following
admissions:
I have received a copy of the (Amended)
Information against me. I have read it, or
had it read to me, and I understand the
nature and the elements of crime(s) to which
I am pleading [guilty] or no contest.
The elements of the crime(s) to which I
am pleading [guilty] are:
Count I: That I, JAMES L. ROBISON, on
or about September 11, 2001, in Juab
County, State of Utah, did issue a check
for the payment of money for the purpose
of obtaining- property knowing that it
would not be paid by the drawee and
payment was refused.
I understand that by pleading guilty, I am
not contesting that I committed the foregoing
crimes. I stipulate and agree that if I am
pleading guilty, I do not dispute or contest
that the following facts describe my conduct
. . . . These facts provide a basis for the
court to accept my [guilty] plea and prove
the elements of crime(s) to which I am
pleading [guilty]:
On or about September 11, 2 0 01, in Juab
County, State of Utah, I issued a check
for the payment of money for the purpose
of obtaining- property knowing that it
would not be paid by the drawee and
payment was refused.
1.
(...continued)
of every defense thereto which may cause a reasonable doubt to
exist as to his guilt, arising either from the evidence, or lack
of evidence, in the case; and this is true whether his defenses
are consistent or not." (emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
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(Emphases added.) The trial court expressly asked Robison if he
had any questions about this written statement, and, except for a
restitution matter, he did not. The court proceeded to question
Robison about his plea decision and, upon satisfying itself that
Robison was acting knowingly and voluntarily, accepted his plea
of guilty.
After accepting the plea, the trial court conducted the
following colloquy to establish its factual basis:
The Judge: Factual basis, Mr. Leavitt?
[Prosecutor] Mr. Leavitt: Your honor,
on the date set forth in the Information this
defendant, James L. Robison, issued a check
or a draft a, in exchange for something of
value at a time when the account upon which
it was written was closed, and the amount
exceeded $5,000 .
Defendant: That is not a correct
statement, Your Honor.
The Judge: What is a correct statement,
Mr.-Defendant: Well, I have a letter from
the . . . .
The correct statement is that
account was not closed, the-The Judge: Well- r
Defendant: --payment was not, was not
honored by the bank but the account was not
closed. I have a letter in my file from the
institution stating that it was open.
The Judge: Okay. You, you did issue a
check which was not honored by your bank. Is
that correct?
Defendant: That's correct.
The Judge: And a, upon notice of it not
being honored did you, did you at any time
make that check good?
Defendant: I attempted to, Your Honor,
and my bonding company also attempted to, but
we were not able to completely do it.
The Judge: Okay. And a, in exchange
for that a car was delivered. Is that
correct? A vehicle was-Defendant: No. The car was delivered
several weeks prior to that.
The Judge: Well, I mean-Defendant: There was a vehicle in, a
transaction did involve a vehicle.
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The Judge: Yes. Okay. And that
vehicle had a value in excess of $5,000?
Defendant: It did, Your Honor.
Based on this colloquy, the trial court found that there was a
factual basis for Robison's guilty plea.
2.

Robison's Admissions Alone Support His Plea

There is nothing in Robison's written or oral statements at
the plea hearing, and certainly nothing in the formal factual
colloquy, to establish a factual or legal defense to a bad check
charge. While alleging a short delay between physical delivery
of the truck and his issuance of the check, Robison failed to
allege that the victim was not "cheated or adversely affected by
the giving of the check." Howells, Inc. v. Nelson, 565 P. 2d
1147, 1149 (Utah 1977). As detailed later in this opinion, the
record as a whole reflects that the victim had retained legal
title to the truck and was only induced to provide it to Robison
upon the issuance of the bad check. Even assuming the trial
court could not consider this record evidence for purposes of
accepting Robison's plea, Robison's failure to deny cheating or
adversely affecting the victim, his admission of a transaction
involving the truck, and his factual admission of his "purpose of
obtaining property" provide more than enough factual basis to
satisfy Rule ll.2
Even if the sole factor to be considered was the passage of
time, there is no precedent establishing that a delay between
receipt of property and issuance of a check automatically
precludes a bad check conviction. To the contrary, in State v.
Bartholomew, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed a bad check
conviction resulting from the issuance of a check one week after
the receipt of stock shares by the defendant. See 724 P.2d 352,
352 (Utah 1986). I see no meaningful distinction between the one
week delay implicitly approved in Bartholomew and the "several

2. Given Robison's written and oral admissions over the course
of the plea hearing, I am also inclined to find that Robison is
estopped from raising the factual basis argument on appeal. The
elements of equitable estoppel are: "(1) an admission, statement
or act inconsistent with the claim afterwards asserted, (2)
action by the other party on the faith of such admission,
statement or act, and (3) injury to such other party resulting
from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such
admission, statement or act." Department of Human Servs. v.
Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676, 680 (Utah 1997). Each of these elements
is arguably present in this matter.
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weeks" delay3 asserted by Robison in the fact colloquy. So long
as there is, as Robison admitted at his plea hearing, but a
single "transaction," I do not view the delay in this matter as
falling outside the legislature's intention or the rule set forth
in Howells. See 565 P.2d at 1149. Any distinction that might be
drawn certainly fails to give rise to "great and manifest
injustice" as relied upon by the majority opinion.4

3. The record reveals an actual delay of ten days between
Robison taking physical possession of the truck and his writing a
bad check in payment for it.
4. State v. Bartholomew, 724 P.2d 352 (Utah 1986), did not
explicitly address the contemporaneous exchange requirement, but
the failure of the supreme court to identify and address the
issue suggests that it would not find Robison's situation to be
one of manifest injustice.
Other states addressing' this issue have expressly concluded
that a short delay between the receipt of goods and the issuance
of a check may still satisfy the exchange requirement:
Where a worthless check is given as payment
for goods already received, there is no
present consideration, and a conviction for
criminal issuance of a bad check must be
reversed unless "the interval [between
delivery of goods or services and payment
therefor] is slight and the exchange can be
characterized as a single contemporaneous
transaction."
Ledford v. State, 362 S.E.2d 133, 134 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987)
(emphasis added) (alteration in original) (citations omitted);
see also State v. Piatt, 845 P'.2d 815, 817 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992)
(holding that "a worthless check is given for something of value
if the worthless check is issued as part of a contemporaneous
transaction between the parties in which something of value is
exchanged for the check, without regard to whether the thing of
value is delivered before or after the worthless check is
issued"). Ledford addressed a payment by check one day after the
receipt of goods, see 3 62 S.E.2d at 133-34, while in Piatt the
defendant issued a bad check fourteen days after the receipt of
goods and services. See 845 P.2d at 816. Both cases found their
particular facts sufficient to support a bad check conviction
under a single contemporaneous transaction standard. See also
Gillev v. State, 356 S.E.2d 655, 656 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (finding
contemporaneous transaction where work completed on Friday and
check delivered the following Monday).
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3.

The Record as a Whole Demonstrates Facts Placing Robison's
Actions Squarely Within the Purview of the Bad Check Statute

As stated above, I would hold that Robison's plea has
adequate factual support solely from the facts admitted at the
plea hearing. However, given the majority's decision to examine
Robison's claims under the "great and manifest injustice"
standard, it is appropriate to examine the remainder of the
record to fill in the details of the transaction underlying
Robison's plea. Those details reveal a very different version of
events than those argued by Robison on appeal. And, unlike this
court, the trial court was well aware of the complete context of
Robison's actions from various pretrial pleadings and the incourt testimony of the victim at a prior motion hearing.5
Robison and his victim had never met prior to the truck
transaction, and there were no prior vehicle transactions between
the two. Robison first contacted the victim by phone6 around the
end of July 2001 to request the victim's assistance in selling a
separate vehicle. In mid-August, Robison again spoke with the
victim seeking to locate a suitable truck for a potential buyer.
The victim located the truck through his wholesaler network and
ordered it for Robison.
Robison took physical possession of the truck on approval
for his customer on September" 1, 2001. That same day, Robison
informed the victim that his customer was interested in buying
the truck, and the victim agreed to send Robison the title and
paperwork7 once Robison provided a check. On September 11, the
victim contacted Robison about payment, and Robision agreed to
send the victim a check, which he did. The victim only sent,
i.e., was "induced to give," Robison title to the trufck after

5. The contextual facts recited in this section of the opinion
are taken from pleadings and exhibits filed in this action,
seeking to determine proper possession of the truck as between
competing third party claimants. At the hearing on this dispute,
the victim in this matter gave extensive testimony about the
facts, circumstances, and timing of the truck transaction.
6. The victim testified that he spoke with Robison four or five
times on the phone prior to September 1, 2001.
7. Exhibits to prior pleadings demonstrate that title to the
truck was not even issued to the victim, and thus could not have
been transferred to Robison, until September 5, 2001. Similarly,
the sales contract contemplated a cash sale of the truck to
Robison on September 11 for $40,812.
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Robison issued a bad check in payment.
1149.

Howells, 565 P.2d at

These supporting facts strongly suggest that Robison ! s
issuance of a bad check was not merely substantially but actually
in exchange for title to, rather than mere physical possession
of, the truck. If Robison believed that these or other facts
conflicted with the legal elements of a bad check charge, he
should have expressly raised the issue at the trial court level.
Had he done so, the facts could have been sifted and justice
assured. Doing this type of analysis at the appellate level,
without the benefit of trial court 'fact sifting,' is
problematic.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, even assuming that the relevant time
period is the ten-day delay between Robison's initial physical
receipt of the truck and his issuance of a bad check, I would
affirm the trial court. Under my reading of Utah law, the court
was justified in accepting Robison's plea solely based on his
admissions that he had issued a check that had not been honored,
that the check was issued in a transaction involving the recent
receipt of a truck, and that the truck had a value in excess of
$5,000. The record further indicates that Robison issued the
check prior to and in exchange for the title and other paperwork
that established legal transfer of ownership of the truck to
Robison.
I see no injustice, great or otherwise, in holding Robison
to his guilty plea and would accordingly affirm the trial court's
denial of Robison's motion to withdraw.

William A. T h o m e Jr. { Judge
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Addendum B

§ 76-6-505.

Issuing a bad check or draft—Presumption

(1) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of
money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or
corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for any
services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, knowing it will not be^paid by the drawee
and payment is refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft.
For purposes of this subsection, a person who issues a check or draft for
which payment is refused by the drawee is presumed to know the check or
draft would not be paid if he had no account with the drawee at the time of
issue.
(2) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of
money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or
corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for any
services, wages, salary, labor, or" rent, payment of which check or draft is
legally refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft if he fails
to make good and actual payment to the payee in the amount of the refused
check or draft within 14 days of his receiving actual notice of the check or
draft's nonpayment.
(3) An offense of issuing a bad check or draft shall be punished as follows:
(a) If the check or draft or series of checks or drafts made or drawn in this
state within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is less
than $300, the offense is a class B misdemeanor.
(b) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state
within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or exceeds
$300 but is less than $1,000, the offense is a class A misdemeanor.
(c) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state
within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or exceeds
$1,000 but is less than $5,000, the offense is a felony of the third degree.
(d) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state
within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or exceeds
$5,000, the offense is a second degree felony.

